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Abstract
ABSTENTATION AND COSTLY INFORMATION ACQUISITION IN ELECTIONS
by
Jacob Meyer, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2019
Major Professor: Dr. Lucas Rentschler, Ph.D
Department: Economics and Finance
I develop and study a model of voter information acquisition about candidate pref-
erences under both mandatory and optional voting schemes. I show theoretically that
optional voting results in a more informed electorate, unless information acquisition is
free or cheap relative to the cost of voting. I show this by characterizing the unique sym-
metric equilibria for information acquisition under both mandatory and optional voting
schemes. The model predicts moderate citizens to be rationally inattentive to candidate
preferences, while more extreme citizens are willing to pay to acquire information about
candidates.
(25 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Abstention and Costly Information Acquisition in Elections
Jacob Meyer
Voter turnout rates are low in the United States. Even among citizens who show
up to the polls, many do not vote in every race on the ballot. This is especially true
for low-profile elections, and races where political party is not on the ballot. Both low
turnout and incomplete ballots could be caused by high costs of information. Voters and
non-voters have time constraints that can prevent them from researching every candidate
or proposition on the ballot. One proposed solution to increase citizen informedness is
to make voting mandatory. Mandatory voting imposes a penalty (usually a fine) if a
citizen fails to turn out on election day. While the introduction of mandatory voting
may increase turnout rates, it is unclear if it will lead to a more informed electorate.
I explore the effects of mandatory voting on information acquisition by developing a
model that compares citizen informedness in a costly election under both mandatory
and optional voting schemes. I find that optional voting results in a more informed
electorate, unless information acquisition is free or extremely cheap relative to the cost
of voting. The model predicts that moderate citizens are less likely to learn about
candidate preferences, compared to citizens with more extreme preferences.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Voter turnout rates are low in the United States. In recent Presidential election
years turnout has been around 60%, and in Midterm election years this drops to about
46% (Ballotpedia, 2019). Even among voters who show up to the polls, many do not vote
in every race on the ballot. Selective abstention is pervasive in U.S. elections, especially
for low-profile races and referendums. Both low turnout and selective abstention are
likely driven by the high costs to become informed about every candidate or referendum
(Ghirardato and Katz, 2006).
Becoming an informed voter is difficult in many elections. Aside from Presidential
and a few other high-profile races, the majority of elections do not enjoy extensive
media coverage. Instead, motivated citizens proactively attend debates, read candidate
websites, and research policy issues in order to stay up to date with candidate platforms.
Some citizens may choose to remain uninformed and/or not vote because the cost to
become informed is too high. Others may choose to become informed in some elections,
but remain uninformed in others. In these cases citizens may turn out to vote, but
choose to abstain in certain races on the ballot rather than to vote for an unknown
candidate or referendum that may upset the status quo (Bowler, Donovan, and Happ,
1992; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1999). This preference is manifest by higher abstention
rates in races where political party is not on the ballot, such as elections for judges, city
council members, county prosecutors, sheriffs, or natural resource managers (Ghirardato
and Katz, 2006; DeAngelo and McCannon, 2019).
One proposed solution to increase citizen informedness in these scenarios is to make
voting mandatory. Mandatory voting imposes a penalty (usually a fine) if a citizen fails
to turn out on election day. Currently, 11 countries enforce mandatory voting, including
Australia, Brazil, Luxembourg, and North Korea. While the introduction of mandatory
2voting may increase turnout rates (Hoffman, Leo´n, and Lombardi, 2017), it is unclear if it
will lead to a more informed electorate. Previous studies find evidence for a causal effect
of citizen informedness on turnout decisions (Lassen, 2005; Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1999), but to my knowledge no study has found causality going the other direction.
I explore the effects of increased turnout on information acquisition by compar-
ing voter informedness in a costly election under both mandatory and optional voting
schemes. I find that optional voting results in a more informed electorate, unless in-
formation acquisition is free or extremely cheap relative to the cost of voting. I show
this by characterizing the unique symmetric equilibria for information acquisition under
both mandatory and optional voting schemes. Consistent with previous literature, the
model predicts moderate citizens to be rationally inattentive to candidate preferences,
while more extreme citizens are willing to pay to acquire information about candidates.
Several studies also find that moderate citizens are less likely to become informed
voters, or to vote at all. Gersbach (1992) finds that the median voter is the least
likely to purchase information in an election. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) model
an election with costless voting and asymmetric information, finding that some of the
less-informed voters always prefer to abstain. They also find that level increases in
aggregate citizen informedness results in higher abstention rates for both the informed
and uninformed. Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008) give experimental evidence
that aggregate turnout is positively correlated with the number of informed voters.
In a theoretical environment, Oliveros (2013) shows that information acquisition and
turnout decisions may in fact be uncorrelated for some voters. Ortoleva and Snowberg
(2015) show theoretically and empirically that moderate citizens have lower turnout rates
compared to more ideologically extreme citizens. Mateˇjka and Tabellini (2017) develop a
theoretical model of voter information acquisition in a multi-dimensional policy election,
finding that moderate voters invest less in information acquisition. They also point out
that including party affiliation could lead to increased voter attention.
Other studies have investigated the effects of mandatory voting laws, with varying
results. Borgers (2004) shows that in a costly voting environment with symmetric voter
preferences, optional voting Pareto dominates mandatory voting in terms of welfare.
Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) extend this work and find that mandatory voting may be
3welfare enhancing when facing uncertainty. Krishna and Morgan (2012) study manda-
tory voting in a Condorcet setting, where voters have identical preferences but differing
information, and find that optional voting is strictly welfare enhancing. To my knowl-
edge, no study has addressed the effects of mandatory voting on citizen informedness.
I add to previous studies by interacting voter information acquisition choices with
optional and mandatory voting schemes. My results confirm that moderate citizens have
the least incentive to learn about candidate platforms, and predicts that a larger share
of moderate citizens will become informed if abstention is allowed, unless information
acquisition is free or extremely cheap relative to the cost of voting.
Chapter 2
The voting game
I investigate voters’ information acquisition choices in a two-candidate election
with an odd number of voters. Voter policy preferences vi are random draws from
a commonly known distribution v(·) over (0, 1). The two candidates A and B have
randomly determined policy preferences defined by mirror distributions a(·) over (0, .5),
and b(·) over (.5, 1). The distributions a(·), b(·), and v(·) are known by all players, but
individually realized policy preferences are private information. Furthermore, voters do
not know which of the candidates is candidate A, and which is B.
The sequence of events in the game is as follows:
1. Voters’ and candidates’ policy preferences are determined and privately revealed
2. Voters may choose to learn the identity of candidates by paying a cost c
3. Voters cast votes and incur cost ε (abstention is allowed in the optional schema)
4. The winning candidate is determined by plurality rule with random tie breaking
5. Resultant payoffs are awarded
The payoff function for each voter vi is given by
pii(K, vi, γ, ei) = K − U(|vi − γ|)− eic− wiε
where K is a positive constant, γ is the realized policy, c is the cost of acquiring
information, and ε is some small cost of voting. −U(|vi − γ|) is a continuous, twice
differentiable, weakly concave function with a single peak at vi = γ. The indicator
variable ei = 1 if voter vi opts to acquire information, and ei = 0 otherwise. Similarly,
5wi = 1 if the voter casts a vote, and wi = 0 if vi abstains (possible only under optional
voting).
Although candidates are initially indistinguishable, each vi has a candidate pref-
erence based on the known candidate distributions a(·) and b(·). Each vi’s candidate
preference is determined by
E[pii|vi, γ ∈ (0, .5)]− E[pii|vi, γ ∈ (.5, 1)] > 0 vi prefers candidate A
E[pii|vi, γ ∈ (0, .5)]− E[pii|vi, γ ∈ (.5, 1)] < 0 vi prefers candidate B
E[pii|vi, γ ∈ (0, .5)]− E[pii|vi, γ ∈ (.5, 1)] = 0 vi indifferent to election outcome.
For ease of reference, I denote players who prefer candidate A as vai , candidate B as v
b
i ,
and those indifferent as vs.
Each voter may choose to learn the identity of candidates by paying a cost c.
This reflects the idea that candidates’ announced platforms are cheap talk, and that
candidates are only constrained by maintaining a policy position consistent with their
party affiliation (Snyder and Ting, 2002). A voter vi will pay to acquire information if
E[pii|vi, ei = 1]− E[pii|vi, ei = 0] ≥ 0. (2.1)
If all voters are best responding, eq.(2.1) implies the existence and uniqueness of a
cutpoint information acquisition strategy, as outlined in Propostion 1.
Proposition 1. Under both mandatory and optional voting schemes, there exists a
perfect Bayes equilibrium in which each voter vi follows the cutpoint strategy
ei =

0 if vi ∈ (v∗l , v∗r )
1 if vi ∈ (0, v∗l )
⋃
(v∗r , 1) ,
for ∗ = {m, o} (2.2)
Proof. The proof for mandatory voting is given in section 2.1, and for optional voting
in 2.2. 
This equilibrium describes an interval of moderate voters who choose to remain
uninformed about candidate identities. The cutpoints are denoted by indices m or o to
allow the possibility of differing cutpoints between the mandatory and optional voting
6schemes. As I show in section 3, the relationship between the cutpoints in the two
schemes will be determined by costs of voting and information acquisition.
2.1 Mandatory Voting
Under mandatory voting, eq. (2.1) for a voter vai can also be written as
E[pii|vi, ei = 1, γ ∈ (0, .5)] · P
(
γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 1
)
+
E[pii|vi, ei = 1, γ ∈ (.5, 1)] · P
(
γ ∈ (.5, 1)|ei = 1
) −[
E[pii|vi, ei = 0, γ ∈ (0, .5)] · P
(
γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 0
)
+
E[pii|vi, ei = 0, γ ∈ (.5, 1)] · P
(
γ ∈ (.5, 1)|ei = 0
)] ≥ 0,
or rather
(K − E[U |vi, γ ∈ (0, .5)]− c− ε) · P
(
γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 1
)
+
(K − E[U |vi, γ ∈ (.5, 1)]− c− ε) · P
(
γ ∈ (.5, 1)|ei = 1
) −[
(K − E[U |vi, γ ∈ (0, .5)]− ε) · P
(
γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 0
)
+
(K − E[U |vi, γ ∈ (.5, 1)]− ε) · P
(
γ ∈ (.5, 1)|ei = 0
)] ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to
−E[U |vi, γ ∈ (0, .5)] ·
(
P
(
γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 1
)− P (γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 0))+[− E[U |vi, γ ∈ (.5, 1)] · (P (γ ∈ (.5, 1)|ei = 1)− P (γ ∈ (.5, 1)|ei = 0))] ≥ c. (2.3)
The expected utilities from each candidates’ election are
−E[U |vi, γ ∈ (0, .5)] =
∫ .5
0
−U(|vi − x|)a(x) dx (2.4)
−E[U |vi, γ ∈ (.5, 1)] =
∫ 1
.5
−U(|vi − x|)b(x) dx. (2.5)
The probability of each candidate’s election depends on the information acquisition
choice of voter vai and the expected votes cast by other vi 6=j .
When ei = 1, player v
a
i will pay to get information, and consequently will correctly
vote for candidate A. Candidate A’s probability of election is determined by the number
of the other players vj 6=i who vote in favor of candidate A,
∑
vaj 6=i. Since all vj 6=i < vl
7will vote for A, and in expectation one half of uninformed players will also vote for A,∑
vaj 6=i ∼ Binomial(p), where p = V (vl) + .5
(
V (vr) − V (vl)
)
. Since I am restricting
attention to symmetric distributions of vi, with a(·) and b(·) being mirror images, p = .5.
P (γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 1) = P
(∑
vaj 6=i ≥
n− 1
2
)
= 1− P
(∑
vaj 6=i <
n− 1
2
)
= 1−
n−3
2∑
k=0
P
(∑
vaj 6=i = k
)
= 1−
n−3
2∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
.5n−1
(2.6)
P (γ ∈ (.5, 1)|ei = 1) = 1− P (γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 1)
=
n−3
2∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
.5n−1
(2.7)
P (γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 0) = P
(∑
vaj 6=i ≥
n+ 1
2
)⋃
P
(∑
vaj 6=i =
n− 1
2
and vi = v
a
i
)
=
n−1∑
k=n+1
2
P
(∑
vaj 6=i = k
)
+ .5P
(∑
vaj 6=i =
n− 1
2
)
=
n−1∑
k=n+1
2
(
n− 1
k
)
.5n−1 +
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
.5n
(2.8)
P (γ ∈ (.5, 1)|ei = 0) = 1− P (γ ∈ (0, .5)|ei = 0)
= 1−
n−1∑
k=n+1
2
(
n− 1
k
)
.5n−1 +
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
.5n
(2.9)
With the results in (2.4) - (2.9), the expression for (2.3) is
8∫ .5
0
−U(|vi − x|)a(x) dx ×[
1−
n−3
2∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
.5n−1 −
(
n−1∑
k=n+1
2
(
n− 1
k
)
.5n−1 +
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
.5n
)]
−
∫ 1
.5
−U(|vi − x|)b(x) dx ×[ n−3
2∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
.5n−1 −
(
1−
(
n−1∑
k=n+1
2
(
n− 1
k
)
.5n−1 +
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
.5n
))]
≥ c,
or rather
(∫ 1
.5
U
(|vi − x|)b(x) dx− ∫ .5
0
U
(|vi − x|)a(x) dx)[(n− 1n−1
2
)
.5n
]
≥ c. (2.10)
This is simply voter vai ’s expected benefit from having their preferred candidate
elected, weighted by the probability of being the pivotal voter. For ease of notation, I
denote LHS(2.10) as F (vi).
In equilibrium, a voter vi = v
m
l is indifferent to purchasing information for price c.
Note that F (0) > 0 due to the concavity of U , and F (vs) = 0 by the definition of vs.
Furthermore, via Leibniz’s rule, ∂F∂vml
is monotonically decreasing:
9∂F
∂vml
=
(∫ 1
.5
∂U
(|vml − x|)
∂|vml − x|
∂|vml − x|
∂vml
b(x) dx−
[
U
(|vml − vml |)a(vml )d(vml )dvml −
U
(|vml − 0|)a(0)d(0)dvml +
∫ vml
0
∂U
(|vml − x|)
∂|vml − x|
∂|vml − x|
∂vml
a(x) dx +
U
(|vml − .5|)a(.5)d(.5)dvml − U(|vml − vml |)a(vml )d(v
m
l )
dvml
+∫ .5
vml
∂U
(|vml − x|)
∂|vml − x|
∂|vml − x|
∂vml
a(x) dx
]) [(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
.5n
]
=
(∫ 1
.5
∂U
(|vml − x|)
∂|vml − x|
(−1)b(x) dx−
[∫ vml
0
∂U
(|vml − x|)
∂|vml − x|
(1)a(x) dx +
∫ .5
vml
∂U
(|vml − x|)
∂|vml − x|
(−1)a(x) dx
])[(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
.5n
]
=
(∫ .5
vml
∂U
∂|vml − x|
a(x)dx−
∫ 1
.5
∂U
∂|vml − x|
b(x)dx−
∫ vml
0
∂U
∂|vml − x|
a(x)dx
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0∀ vml
×
[(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
.5n
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1) ∀ n∈Z+
.
(2.11)
The intermediate value theorem establishes the existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium threshold vi = v
m
l where F (v
m
l ) = c, for c ∈ (0, F (0)). Any voter in (0, vml )
will pay to acquire information, and any voter in (vml , v
s) will not. A similar proof
for vbi yields a unique solution for v
m
r , where any voter in (v
m
r , 1) will pay to acquire
information, and any voter in (vs, vmr ) will not. 
2.2 Optional voting
Under optional voting, voters may choose to abstain from voting, in addition to
choosing whether or not to acquire information about candidates’ party affiliation. For
a cost of voting ε > 0, no voter will choose to remain uninformed and to vote, since
E[pii|vi, ei = 0, wi = 0]− E[pii|vi, ei = 0, wi = 1] = ε > 0.
Similarly, no voter will become informed and then not vote, since
E[pii|vi, ei = 0, wi = 0]− E[pii|vi, ei = 1, wi = 0] = c > 0.
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Thus, under optional voting, eq. (2.1) becomes
E[pii|vi, ei = wi = 1]− E[pii|vi, ei = wi = 0] ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
[
K − E[U |vi, ei = wi = 1]− c− ε]
]− [K − E[U |vi, ei = wi = 0]] ≥ 0.
This reduces to
E[U |vi, ei = wi = 1]− E[U |vi, ei = wi = 0] ≥ c+ ε. (2.12)
The expected utility from getting informed and voting is
E[U |vi, ei = wi = 1] = E[U |vi, ei = wi = 0] +
.5
(∫ 1
.5
U
(|vi − x|)b(x) dx− ∫ .5
0
U
(|vi − x|)a(x) dx)×
n−1
2∑
t=0
1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
t
)(
n− 1− t
n− 1− 2t− s
)(
1− 2V (vol )
)n−1−s−2t
V (vol )
2t+s.
Inserting into (2.12) yields
(∫ 1
.5
U
(|vi − x|)b(x) dx− ∫ .5
0
U
(|vi − x|)a(x) dx)×
.5
[ n−1
2∑
t=0
1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
t
)(
n− 1− t
n− 1− 2t− s
)(
1− 2V (vol )
)n−1−s−2t
V (vol )
2t+s
]
≥ c+ ε
(2.13)
Similar to the mandatory case, this is simply the expected benefit of vai ’s preferred
candidate being elected, weighted by the probability of being the pivotal voter. For ease
of reference I denote LHS(2.13) as G(vi).
In equilibrium, a voter vi = v
o
l will be indifferent between abstaining and acquiring
information and voting for cost c+ε. Note that G(vi = v
o
l = 0) > 0 due to the concavity
of U , and G(vi = v
o
l = v
s) = 0, by the definition of vs. Furthermore, via Leibniz’s rule,
∂G(vi=v
o
l )
∂vol
< 0:
11
∂G
∂vol
=
(∫ .5
vol
∂U
∂|vol − x|
a(x)dx−
∫ 1
.5
∂U
∂|vol − x|
b(x)dx−
∫ vol
0
∂U
∂|vol − x|
a(x)dx
)
×
.5
[ n−1
2∑
t=0
1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
t
)(
n− 1− t
n− 1− 2t− s
)(
1− 2V (vol )
)n−1−s−2t
V (vol )
2t+s
]
+(∫ 1
.5
U
(|vol − x|)b(x) dx− ∫ .5
0
U
(|vol − x|)a(x) dx)×
.5
[ n−1
2∑
t=0
1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
t
)(
n− 1− t
n− 1− 2t− s
)
×[
(n− 1− s− 2t)(1− 2V (vol ))n−2−s−2t(−2v(vol ))V (vol )2t+s +
(
1− 2V (vol )
)n−1−s−2t
(2t+ s)V (vol )
2t+s−1v(vol )
]]
=
(∫ .5
vol
∂U
∂|vol − x|
a(x) dx−
∫ 1
.5
∂U
∂|vol − x|
b(x) dx−
∫ vol
0
∂U
∂|vol − x|
a(x) dx
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 ∀ vl∈(0,.5)
×
.5
[ n−1
2∑
t=0
1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
t
)(
n− 1− t
n− 1− 2t− s
)(
1− 2V (vol )
)n−1−s−2t
V (vol )
2t+s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1) ∀ V (vl)∈(0,.5),n∈Z+
+
v(vol )
n.5
(∫ 1
.5
U
(|vol − x|)b(x) dx− ∫ .5
0
U
(|vol − x|)a(x) dx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 ∀ vl∈(0,.5)
×
[ n−1
2∑
t=0
1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
t
)(
n− 1− t
n− 1− 2t− s
)((
1− 2V (vol )
)n−2−s−2t
V (vol )
2t+s−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 ∀ V (vl)∈(0,.5),n∈Z+
×
[
(2t+ s)− 2V (vol )(n− 1)
]]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 ∀ V (vl)∈(0,.5),n∈Z+
.
(2.14)
The intermediate value theorem establishes the existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium cutpoint vi = v
o
l where G(v
o
l ) = c + ε, for c + ε ∈ (0, G(0)). To confirm
that voters in (vlo, vs) will follow the cutpoint strategy in (2.2), I note that G(vi = 0) is
strictly positive, G(vi = v
s) = 0, and ∂G(vi)∂vi < 0 (taking v
o
l as fixed):
12
∂G(vi)
∂vi
=
(∫ .5
vi
∂U
∂|vi − x|a(x) dx−
∫ 1
.5
∂U
∂|vi − x|b(x) dx−
∫ vi
0
∂U
∂|vi − x|a(x) dx
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 ∀ vi∈(0,.5)
×
.5
[ n−1
2∑
t=0
1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
t
)(
n− 1− t
n− 1− 2t− s
)(
1− 2V (vol )
)n−1−s−2t
V (vol )
2t+s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1) ∀ V (vol )∈(0,.5),n∈Z+
.
(2.15)
Thus, voters have no incentive to deviate from the cutpoint strategy, and all voters
in (0, vol ) will pay to acquire information, and those in (v
o
l , v
s) will not. A symmetric
procedure yields vor where voters in (v
s, vor) will pay to acquire information, and those
in (vor , 1) will not. 
Chapter 3
Comparing optional and mandatory voting
The cutpoint strategy in Proposition 1 allows for equilibria where none, some, or
all of the electorate will choose to become informed about candidate preferences. If
the costs of voting and information acquisition are such that some voters are willing to
purchase information, I can compare the equilibrium cutpoints between mandatory and
optional voting to determine which voting scheme results in a more informed electorate.
Under mandatory voting, the proportion of the population that chooses to become
informed is dependent only upon the cost of getting information, c. When voting is
optional, the choice to become informed depends on the cost of getting information c
as well as the cost of voting ε. I investigate whether mandatory or optional voting
results in a more informed electorate for different costs of c and ε by comparing the two
equilibrium solutions determined by (2.10) and (2.13). As I show below, allowing for
abstention does not decrease voter informedness, unless information is free or extremely
cheap relative to the cost of voting.
Proposition 2. When c = ε = 0, vol = v
m
l = .5.
Proof. This is a natural result of the equilibrium conditions in both (2.10) and (2.13).

When the cost of voting and the cost of information acquisition are zero, every
player gets informed and every player votes, independent of the ability to abstain. The
choices to remain uninformed and to not vote are strictly dominated.
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Proposition 3. When ε = 0 and c > 0, vml (c) ≤ vol (c).
Proof. Under mandatory and optional voting, vml (c) and v
o
l (c) are implicitly defined
by equations (2.10) and (2.13):
(∫ 1
.5
U
(|vml − x|)b(x) dx− ∫ .5
0
U
(|vml − x|)a(x) dx)[(n− 1n−1
2
)
.5n
]
− c = 0 (2.10∗)
(∫ 1
.5
U
(|vol − x|)b(x) dx− ∫ .5
0
U
(|vol − x|)a(x) dx)×
.5
[ n−1
2∑
t=0
1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
t
)(
n− 1− t
n− 1− 2t− s
)(
1− 2V (vol )
)n−1−s−2t
V (vol )
2t+s
]
− c− ε
= 0
(2.13∗)
From Proposition 2, vml (0) = v
o
l (0) = .5. Furthermore, v
m
l (v
s
i ) = v
o
l (v
s
i ) = 0,
by the definition of vsi . I now turn attention to
dvml
dc and
dvol
dc . For ease of notation, let
LHS(2.10∗) = H(vl, c) and LHS (2.13∗)= J(vl, c). Total differentiation w.r.t. c yields:
∂H
∂c
dc
dc
+
∂H
∂vml
dvml
dc
= 0
⇒ dv
m
l
dc
= −
∂H
∂c
∂H
∂vml
=
1
Hvml
and
∂J
∂c
dc
dc
+
∂J
∂vol
dvol
dc
= 0
⇒ dv
o
l
dc
= −
∂J
∂c
∂J
∂vol
=
1
Jvol .
Recalling the solutions of Hvml and Jv
m
l
from (2.11) and (2.14), this results in
dvml
dc
=
1
(2.11)
and
dvol
dc
=
1
(2.14),
which can be readily compared to yield
dvml
dc <
dvol
dc < 0. This implies
vml < v
o
l ∀ c ∈
(
0,max
{
lim
vi→0+
F (vi), lim
vi→0+
G(vi)− ε
}
= lim
vi→0+
G(vi)
)
and
vml = v
o
l = 0 ∀ c ≥ lim
vi→0+
G(vi).

When the cost of voting is zero, and the cost of acquiring information is sufficiently
small, a subset of the population will always choose to become informed. If abstention is
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allowed, the expected number of voters who cast votes will be less than the population
total, thus increasing the probability of being pivotal. In these scenarios the equilibrium
cutpoint vol determined by (2.13
∗) will be less than vml determined by (2.10
∗): mandatory
voting will never result in a more informed electorate.
Note, for a cost of voting c ∈
(
lim
vi→0+
F (vi), lim
vi→0+
G(vi)
)
, no voter will be informed
if voting is mandatory, but some will choose to be informed if abstention is allowed.
Furthermore, when the cost of information is sufficiently high, no one will pay to become
informed, and allowing for abstention has no effect on voter informedness.
Proposition 4. When ε > lim
vi→0+
G(vi)− lim
vi→0+
F (vi) and c ≥ 0, vol (c) = 0 ≤ vml (c).
Proof. The introduction of a cost of voting ε > lim
vi→0+
G(vi) − lim
vi→0+
F (vi) shifts v
o
l (c)
to the left by ε such that vol (0) < v
m
l (0), and lim
vi→0+
G(vi) − ε < lim
vi→0+
F (vi). From the
proof of Proposition 3,
dvml
dc <
dvol
dc < 0, which implies
vol < v
m
l ∀ c ∈
(
0,max
{
lim
vi→0+
F (vi), lim
vi→0+
G(vi)− ε
}
= lim
vi→0+
F (vi)
)
and
vol = v
m
l = 0 ∀ c > lim
vi→0+
F (vi).

When voting is sufficiently costly, allowing for abstention will never increase voter
informedness. This is because the cost of voting is prohibitively costly; if abstention is
allowed, no one is willing to turn out to vote, as the cost of voting exceeds any potential
benefit from the election outcome. In turn, no one is willing to pay to become informed
if abstention is allowed. However, for sufficiently low costs of information, mandatory
voting may result in some voters becoming informed, since the cost of voting is treated
as sunk.
Given that real-world turnout rates are greater than zero, this case does not seem
likely. While the cost voting may dissuade some voters under optional voting, it is not
likely to be so high that it entirely discourages voter participation.
Proposition 5. When ε ∈
(
0, lim
vi→0+
G(vi) − lim
vi→0+
F (vi)
)
, ∃ c¯ such that vol (c) < vml (c)
for c ∈ [0, c¯), and vml (c) ≤ vol (c) for c ≥ c¯.
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Proof. The arguments in the proof of Proposition 3 establish the existence and
uniqueness of c¯. The introduction of a small cost of voting ε ∈
(
0, lim
vi→0+
G(vi) −
lim
vi→0+
F (vi)
)
shifts vol (c) to the left by ε, such that v
o
l (0) < v
m
l (0), and lim
vi→0+
F (vi) <
lim
vi→0+
G(vi)− ε. Given the result in the proof of Proposition 3 that dv
m
l
dc <
dvol
dc < 0, the
intermediate value theorem guarantees existence of a unique c¯ ∈
(
0, lim
vi→0+
G(vi) − ε
)
where vml (c¯) = v
o
l (c¯). 
In situations where the cost of voting is positive, allowing for abstention may in-
crease or decrease voter informedness relative to mandatory voting, depending on the
cost of information acquisition. This situation is perhaps the most interesting to con-
sider, as both voting and information acquisition are always costly to some degree.
When the cost of getting information about candidates is low relative to the cost of
voting, allowing for abstention will decrease voter informedness. This is because under
mandatory voting, voters are forced to treat the cost of voting as sunk while making
their information acquisition choice. However, when the cost of voting is small, or the
cost of becoming informed about candidate preferences is large (or both), the increased
probability of being pivotal under optional voting can outweigh the cost of voting. In
these scenarios, optional voting will result in a more informed electorate. This is likely
the case for many elections.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
In real-world elections, both voting and information acquisition are costly. This
scenario is captured in the equilibrium condition outlined in Proposition 5. In this
case, allowing for abstention may increase or decrease voter informedness. The effect of
abstention will depend on the relative costs of voting and information acquisition.
Mandatory voting increases informedness if it is easy to learn candidates’ true
preferences, or if voting is prohibitively costly. Since observed turnout rates are greater
than zero in existing voluntary U.S. elections, it is not likely that voting is sufficiently
costly so as to render optional voting strictly dominated. However, in certain elections
with extensive media coverage, such as Presidential or other high profile elections, the
cost of information may be sufficiently low that mandatory voting would result in a more
informed electorate.
In elections where it is more difficult to learn the policy preferences of candidates,
optional voting will produce a more informed electorate. This is the case for elections
where information about candidate preferences is not broadly communicated, where
political affiliation is not included on the ballot, or where a referendum is not well
advertised. Further, this could be the case in broadly publicized elections where strate-
gic candidates’ use of cheap talk obscures their true policy preferences. This last case
is arguably the most realistic, as candidates are likely to be strategic in their mar-
keting strategies. Future research could explore these scenarios by comparing voter
informedness between optional and mandatory voting when candidate platform choices
are endogenous.
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